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The Tenuous Nature Of The
Medicaid Entitlement
Federal rights remain under threat and must be strengthened.
by Timothy Stoltzfus Jost
ABSTRACT: Although Medicaid is regarded as a federal entitlement program, nowhere
does the Medicaid statute explicitly recognize a federal right of action to enforce recipients’
rights. Arguably, the Supreme Court, rather than Congress, first recognized the right of
Medicaid recipients to protection of federal law. A controversial 2001 federal court decision,
however, called into question the continuing existence of federally enforceable Medicaid
rights. Although this decision has been reversed, it illuminates the tenuous nature of the
Medicaid entitlement, as do recent Supreme Court decisions narrowing federal rights. Con-
gress should amend the Medicaid statute to ensure the rights of Medicaid recipients.
T
he benef i c iar ie s of medicare , one of our two great public health
care financing programs, enjoy an entitlement to health care services that is
solidly grounded in federal law and enforceable in the federal courts. The le-
gal rights of Medicaid recipients, by contrast, have from the outset been far less
clear and remain far more at risk. Indeed, a controversial 2001 federal court deci-
sion radically rejected the right of Medicaid recipients to a federal right of action
enforceable in the federal courts. Although that case has now been reversed, re-
cent Supreme Court decisions continue to leave Medicaid recipients’ legal protec-
tion very much in doubt. These developments call into question the wisdom of the
current structure of the Medicaid program, under which the federal government
pays the bulk of program costs without explicitly guaranteeing recipients a fed-
eral right of action to protect their access to eligibility and services.
 Language of entitlement. Medicare has always been a federal entitlement.
Throughout Title XVIII, Medicare beneficiaries are referred to as “persons entitled
to benefits,” a phrase that appears more than 100 times in various forms in the cur-
rent Medicare statute. Medicare beneficiaries are explicitly granted access to the
federal courts to seek protection of their entitlements to eligibility and services.1 The
language of entitlement, on the other hand, is curiously absent from the original
Medicaid statute. Medicaid began as an extension of the earlier Kerr-Mills legisla-
tion and was titled “Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs.” It provided
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funds “for the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the condi-
tions in such state,” to furnish medical assistance to welfare recipients and the medi-
cally needy.2 It clearly created an entitlement for the states but was more vague as to
the rights and remedies it offered individual recipients.
The 1965 Medicaid statute, like Kerr-Mills, required states to provide adminis-
trative hearings to Medicaid recipients. In many states, decisions reached in these
hearings would have been reviewable in state court.3 But many states regarded
welfare recipients as beneficiaries of charity rather than as entitled to rights.
Moreover, state officers presiding over fair hearings generally lacked the power to
find that state programs had violated federal law. What recipients and their advo-
cates wanted and needed was a remedy in federal court.
 “Right of action” according to the Supreme Court. Although the Medicaid
statute was obviously intended to create federal rights for recipients, nowhere does
it recognize a private right of action for them to enforce those rights or establish fed-
eral court jurisdiction over Medicaid claims. In a series of cases decided between
1968 and 1975, however, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a right of ac-
tion, enforceable in the federal courts, to enforce the requirements of federal welfare
programs, including Medicaid.
In King v. Smith, the first of these, the Court stated: “There is of course no ques-
tion that the Federal Government…may impose the terms and conditions upon
which its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed, and that any state law
or regulation inconsistent with such federal terms and conditions is to that extent
invalid.”4 The Court also recognized that although the Social Security Act itself
provided welfare recipients neither a private right of action nor access to the fed-
eral courts, recipients whose federal rights were violated by state welfare pro-
grams could sue in federal court under 42 U.S. Code, Section 1983. Section 1983 is a
Reconstruction-era civil rights law that provides a remedy when state officials
transgress rights created by federal law. Building on a series of civil rights cases
that had elaborated Section 1983 law, the Court permitted welfare recipients to
bypass state remedies and go directly into federal court.
Although the Court decided King v. Smith on statutory grounds, it reserved judg-
ment on whether Section 1983 actions could be brought challenging state welfare
provisions solely on the basis of Social Security Act violations in the absence of a
constitutional claim.5 The existence of a Section 1983 right of action for statutory
violations was not finally established until more than a decade later, when the Su-
preme Court in Maine v. Thiboutout decided that Section 1983, which affords redress
for violation of the “Constitution and laws,” covered violations of the Social Secu-
rity Act.6 In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association in 1990, the Court held that provid-
ers also had a cause of action under Section 1983 against illegal state action.7
 “Right of action” according to Congress. Congress has never amended the
Medicaid statute to clarify the existence of a federal right of action, but on two occa-
sions in the 1990s Congress confirmed the existence of such a right. In 1992 the Su-
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preme Court decided a case limiting the reach of Section 1983.8 Congress responded
decisively, adopting Section 1130A of the Social Security Act, rejecting the Court’s
narrow reading of Section 1983 and restoring the law as it existed prior to the case.
Further, in 1995 and 1996 the “Contract with America” Congress adopted legisla-
tion, subsequently vetoed by President Bill Clinton, repealing the Section 1983 right
of action for Medicaid recipients and thereby acknowledging the existence of such a
right.9 Until recently, therefore, the right of Medicaid recipients to a federal right of
action to enforce a federal Medicaid entitlement in the federal courts seemed secure.
 Another barrier to enforcing rights. Recipients and providers asserting
Medicaid rights also, however, confront another barrier: the Eleventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment forbids private suits
against the states in federal courts. It has long been clear that this amendment fore-
closes recovery of damages against the states in federal court for violations of
Medicaid program requirements.10 Since 1908, however, the Supreme Court has held
that the federal courts can enjoin a state officer from violating federal law without
violating the Eleventh Amendment.11 According to the Ex parte Young doctrine, be-
cause the Supremacy Clause prohibits the states from violating the federal law, any
state officer who does so is acting outside of the state’s authority and can be ordered
by the federal court to stop. Until recently, therefore, it was settled that continuing
violations of the Medicaid statute could be enjoined by the federal courts.
Medicaid: A Weak Entitlement
Although Medicaid has come to be accepted as a federal entitlement, with fed-
eral rights protected by the federal courts, it has never been a very robust one.
Those recipients who fall into “mandatory” eligibility categories—Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) recipients; recipients of the former Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) program, and, since the late 1980s, poor children and
pregnant women—can claim eligibility as of right. They also have a right to ser-
vices “with reasonable promptness.”12
 Vague coverage. The Medicaid statute is much vaguer as to what services
this entitlement covers. Medicaid programs can cover almost any health care service
but are only required to provide a short list of services, including hospital, physician,
and skilled nursing facility care.13 The main protection as to adequacy of services is a
regulatory requirement that each service “must be of sufficient amount, duration,
and scope to reasonably achieve its purpose.”14 Medicaid regulations also prohibit
states from arbitrarily denying or reducing the amount, duration, or scope of a re-
quired service “solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.”15
 Requirements that may be waived away. Several of the most important re-
quirements of the statute can be waived by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), however, and virtually all program requirements can be waived for
Section 1115 demonstration projects. The 1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA) stream-
lined this waiver process and modified requirements that limited state managed
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care initiatives, such as the “free choice of providers” requirement. The Bush admin-
istration’s recent Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) demon-
stration initiative gives the states even freer rein to disregard basic program require-
ments for some eligibility groups.16
 Even weaker rights for providers. Medicaid providers have even weaker
threads on which to hang their claims. Although the Supreme Court in Wilder v. Vir-
ginia Hospital Association recognized the right of providers to sue state Medicaid pro-
grams in federal court, few statutory provisions protect them from unreasonably
low payment levels or arbitrary budget cuts.17 For a time providers enjoyed some
success under the 1976 Boren Amendment, which imposed limited substantive and
procedural requirements on state Medicaid rate setting for hospitals and nursing fa-
cilities.18 This provision was repealed by the 1997 BBA, leaving providers protected
only by the general requirement that payments must be consistent with “efficiency,
economy, quality of care” and sufficient to provide Medicaid recipients access to ser-
vices to the extent that they are available to the general population.19
Legal Challenges To Program Limitations
Nevertheless, recipients and providers have brought a steady stream of litiga-
tion in federal court challenging state Medicaid program limitations, with some
success. During 1999 recipients and providers prevailed in 53 percent of the re-
ported federal court cases that they brought against Medicaid programs, while in
2000 they won 48 percent of these cases.20 Recipients were more successful than
providers, prevailing 61 percent of the time in suits in 1999 and 2000, while provid-
ers prevailed only 35 percent of the time in 1999 and 38 percent in 2000.21
 “Westside Mothers”: a setback. In the spring of 2001, however, a widely re-
ported federal court case rejected the long established understanding that the
Medicaid program created federal rights enforceable in federal court. In Westside
Mothers v. Haveman, Judge Robert H. Cleland, an activist conservative judge, rejected
the principles of federal jurisdiction that had been accepted for decades in Medicaid
cases.22 Westside Mothers began as a routine challenge to Michigan’s implementation of
the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) program in the
managed care context. The EPSDT program is one of the few services that state
Medicaid programs must cover under federal law.23
Judge Cleland’s lengthy opinion rejected root and branch the right of Medicaid
recipients to sue the states in federal court to enforce federal program require-
ments. First, Judge Cleland held that under the Tenth Amendment, states are in-
dependent sovereigns. The federal government is, therefore, not able to compel
states to comply with Medicaid requirements, except insofar as states voluntarily
enter into a “contract” with the federal government to do so.
Judge Cleland held, moreover, that Medicaid recipients were powerless to en-
force this contract in federal court. First, he held such litigation is precluded be-
cause of the states’ sovereign immunity, protected by the Eleventh Amendment.
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He rejected the applicability of the Ex parte Young doctrine, discussed above in the
Medicaid cases. He held that Medicaid is a spending program and that federal
laws adopted pursuant to the spending clause are not the supreme law of the land.
Second, he held that Ex parte Young did not apply when a state officer is properly
acting under authority of state law. Third, he held that federal courts are power-
less under Ex parte Young to compel state officers to perform discretionary acts. At
each step, Judge Cleland rejected a long tradition of doctrinal interpretation, often
relying on quotes from concurring opinion or crystal ball gazing as to the tenden-
cies of recent Supreme Court decisions.
Judge Cleland, however, did not simply rely on the state’s Eleventh Amendment
protection but also held that Medicaid recipients have no federal right to sue un-
der Section 1983. Here, he returned to his basic premise that Medicaid is based on
a contract between the federal and state governments. This contract, he con-
tended, does not provide unambiguously for enforcement by recipients. Moreover,
recipients have no right to sue as third-party beneficiaries of the federal-state con-
tract because such beneficiaries were not permitted to sue to enforce contacts in
1871, when Section 1983 was adopted. Cleland’s opinion, in sum, clearly and deci-
sively rejected the existence of a federal right of action to protect Medicaid recipi-
ents and federal court jurisdiction to enforce this right.
The states immediately leapt on Westside Mothers as a way out of the Medicaid lit-
igation that has long burdened them. The case was argued across the country in
pending Medicaid litigation, but in decision after decision district court judges re-
jected the case as a radical change in established law.24
Finally, in May 2002 the issue reached the federal courts of appeal. On May 9
the conservative Fourth Circuit rejected North Carolina’s Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity defense, holding that the claim before it, challenging North
Carolina’s inadequate provision of Medicaid dental care, fell squarely within the
Ex parte Young doctrine permitting prospective relief from an ongoing violation of
federal law.25 The court further repudiated Westside Mothers’ holding that laws
adopted under the spending power were not the supreme law of the land as a
“novel position…at odds with existing, binding precedent.”26
A week later the District Court decision in Westside Mothers itself was over-
turned by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.27 Although the panel that decided
the Westside Mothers appeal included one of the most vocally conservative members
of the often divided Sixth Circuit, the panel spoke with one voice, decisively re-
jecting Judge Cleland’s decision on every ground.
The Medicaid program was not established through a mere contract, the court
held, but rather by federal law, which is the supreme law of the land. A suit to pro-
spectively enjoin violation of the law is properly brought within Ex parte Young. Su-
preme Court precedent also bound the court to recognize a right of action in
Medicaid recipients under Section 1983 to enforce specific rights created under
the Medicaid statute. The Court of Appeals opinion thoroughly rejected step by
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step Judge Cleland’s speculation as to the Supreme Court’s future direction, rely-
ing instead on the Court’s established precedents.
As of this writing, although cases are still pending in other circuits, it is un-
likely that these courts will deviate from the Fourth and Sixth Circuit holdings.
Without a split in the circuits, the case is unlikely to reach the Supreme Court.
 The Supreme Court weighs in. Two Supreme Court cases decided in June
2002, however, leave a continued cloud over the future rights of Medicaid recipients.
The first, Barnes v. Gorman, involved the availability of punitive damages against a mu-
nicipality under federal disability discrimination statutes.28 Justice Antonin Scalia,
writing for the Court, held that punitive damages were not available, relying on the
argument that federal judicial remedies available under the discrimination statutes
are limited to those afforded under the federal civil rights laws for spending clause
programs. Scalia argued that spending clause legislation operates “much in the na-
ture of a contract: in return for federal funds the [recipients] agree to comply with
federally imposed conditions.”29 Because the “contract” in the case at bar did not un-
ambiguously include the threat of punitive damages, they were not available.
A similar argument was, of course, relied on by Judge Cleland in holding that
the federal Medicaid contract with the states did not include a federal right of ac-
tion for recipients. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Stephen G. Breyer
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred in the result in Barnes but objected to the
broad contract analogy argued by Scalia. They explicitly mentioned Westside
Mothers as an example of judicial overreaching relying on the contract analogy.30
Although Scalia himself acknowledged that spending clause programs, like
Medicaid, are based on federal law and not only on contract, states will undoubt-
edly rely on Barnes to argue that their obligations under Medicaid are purely con-
tractual, enforceable by the federal government and not by recipients or providers.
In the second case, Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Court held that Section 1983
does not provide a federal cause of action to enforce the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act.31 Justice William H. Rehnquist, writing for the Court,
concluded: “[I]f Congress wishes to create new rights enforceable under §1983, it
must do so in clear and unambiguous terms—no less and no more than what is re-
quired for Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied private
right of action.”32 Although the Court distinguished Wilder rather than overruling
it, at least some federal Medicaid requirements may not create “clear and unam-
biguous” rights. One state has already relied on this decision to move to dismiss a
case brought by Medicaid recipients.
Deficits Of State Control
Westside Mothers and these recent Supreme Court decisions point to the funda-
mental weakness of providing health care to the poor though a cooperative fed-
eral-state program. The 1935 Social Security Act created the Social Security retire-
ment pension program as a national social insurance program, administered by
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the federal government. It established public assistance programs for the indigent
elderly and families as cooperative federal-state programs. Thirty years later
Medicare followed the Social Security model, but Medicaid merely expanded pro-
grams that had been created in 1950 and augmented in 1960, providing medical as-
sistance to supplement federal-state cash assistance.
The fact that Medicaid is a federal-state cooperative program, rather than a na-
tional program like Medicare, is an artifact of a history of which we should not be
proud. It is in part the history of trying to keep poor people on relief under the
thumb of local government, where their lives could be managed more closely.33 It is
also in part the history of racism, with which President Roosevelt had to come to
terms to get his New Deal programs past Southern Democratics in Congress who
insisted on control over who got welfare and how much.34
The primary continuing rationale for state involvement in Medicaid has been
the “laboratories of democracy” argument, yet while a few states have creatively
used their discretion under Medicaid to expand coverage or services, many others
have used it to restrict eligibility, benefits, and provider payments, leaving many
poor people uncovered or without access to high-quality care.
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) provides a useful illus-
tration of what the state “laboratories” might do if the federal Medicaid entitle-
ment were totally abolished. SCHIP was explicitly created as a nonentitlement
program.35 Significantly, none of the states that have created independent SCHIP
programs have recognized explicit state entitlements to SCHIP coverage, and six-
teen states expressly provide that SCHIP is not an entitlement.36
State control over Medicaid has brought us great disparities in eligibility, avail-
ability of services, and provider payments. The need of poor Americans for health
care and their inability to pay for it do not vary depending on state of residence, as
their Medicaid coverage does.37 While geographic disparities in the Medicare pro-
gram are considered to be a major policy problem, they are inevitable in Medicaid
as it is currently structured.38
State control over Medicaid programs has resulted in endless gaming as states
devise creative ways to increase federal cost sharing without increasing their own
budgets. The provider tax/disproportionate-share hospital (DSH) payment scams
of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the abuses of upper payment limit (UPL) re-
quirements in the late 1990s, increased the federal burden of the cost of the pro-
gram without increasing state responsibility.39 Interstate competition also has the
potential for creating a “race to the bottom,” as states restrain benefit growth for
fear of attracting poor people from, or losing taxpayers to, other states, and dis-
courages states from getting out in front of others in offering more generous pro-
grams.40 Finally, state responsibility for Medicaid programs has produced program
cuts when times are hard, because almost all states are constitutionally prohibited
from running deficits, even though Medicaid is a countercyclical program and must
thus be funded more rather than less generously during recessions.41
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universal nat ional public health insurance program, which would
give the poor equal rights to receive health care with dignity, does not seem
to be on the political horizon. Federalization of the Medicaid program is
not quite such a radical idea. The state Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled pro-
gram was federalized in 1972, and a proposal to federalize Medicaid was put for-
ward by the Nixon administration.42 With a national program would come, pre-
sumably, a federal right of action enforceable in the federal courts.
At the very least, however, Congress should explicitly recognize the federal
right of action to enforce federal Medicaid requirements that it has long assumed
exists, including jurisdiction in the federal courts to protect it. If it fails to do so,
we face the serious risk of further judicial undermining of the rights of Medicaid
recipients and their access to the courts. Medicaid will consume 145 billion fed-
eral dollars this year, 7 percent of the federal budget.43 To lavish this amount of
money on the states while denying any federal rights to Medicaid recipients, the
intended beneficiaries of the program, seems not only unjust but also foolish.
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